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RECENT DECISIONS
In Forma Pauperis Relief-AN ENDLESS ROAD?-&In Re Smith
At early common law, a pauper seeking judicial relief prayed to the
English Justices in Eyre for a cost-free deliverance.' Today, the prayer
is the same but the deliverance is provided through in forma pauperis
statutes.
2
The origin of in forma pauperis relief has been traced as far back as
Magna Carta.3 Historians follow the then new and vague concept through
the period of the Justices in Eyre into the early Chancery Courts.4 To-
day, in the United States, the rights of the indigent are outlined in a
federal statute which provides:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security
therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such
costs or give security therefor.
This statute attempts to provide relief to those whose poverty would
otherwise deny them an adequate defense in criminal cases, and it allows
1 See 24 SEm. Soc. xxvi, xxviii (1912).
2Today, in the United States, many states have provided statutes which allow indi-
gents access to the courts without paying certain fees and costs normally required.
Whether the courts, in the absence of statutory authority, have inherent power to
permit suits to be brought by poor persons is a matter on which there is a split of
authority. For many years, the majority of jurisdictions have held that the right to
sue in forma pauperis depends upon statutory authorization. See Roy v. Louisville N.O.
& T.R.R., 34 F. 276 (6th Cir. 1888); Harrison v. Stanton, 146 Ind. 366, 45 N.E. 582
(1896). See also Annot., 6 AL.R. 1281 (1920). A few jurisdictions have taken the
view that there is a common law right to sue in forma pauperis and statutory authoriza-
tion is not necessary. See Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
See also Annot, 6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920). In any case, the granting or refusing of permis-
sion to proceed in forma pauperis is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
court. See Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1965).
a See W. McKEcHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A Co mrNTARY ON T GREAT CHARTER OF
KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914).
4See 1 E. DANImLL, PLEADING AND PRAccE OF Tm HiGH CouRT OF CHANCERY 38 (6th
rev. ed. 1894). During the reign of Henry VII, the rights of the poor took a more
definite shape with the adoption of a statute (11 Hen. VII ch. 12) that provided in forma
paupers relief in common law courts, and entitled paupers to writs of assignment of
counsel without payment of fees or costs. See 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HsoRY OF ENc-
LIsH LAW 538 (1924).
S28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) (1964).
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these individuals access to a tribunal for the redress of wrongs and litiga-
tion of their claims."
The rights of the indigent to proceed in forma pauperis have also been
steadily advanced and enhanced through case law. This has been par-
ticularly true in the area of criminal law, however the advancement on
the civil side has been noticeably slower.
The landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois7 provided the cornerstone for
the rapid growth of the indigent's rights in the criminal area." In that
case the United States Supreme Court held that when a state requires
transcripts for a full appellate review of a criminal case, it must, con-
sonant with due process and equal protection, provide such transcripts
to indigents without chargeY Until recently, the reasoning and spirit of
Griffin has been confined to the criminal field.' ° However, in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections," the Supreme Court took a bold step 12 and
applied Griffin principles to a civil case. In Harper, the Court held that
a state poll tax was an unreasonable classification based on wealth which
denied to the indigent the right to vote, and was therefore in violation
of the equal protection clause.' 3 A further extension of Griffin into the
civil area was brought about through the recent case of Boddie v. Con-
necticut,'4 where the appellants were seeking a divorce but could not pay
the court fees and costs because of their impoverished condition. The
Court held that they were unreasonably denied access to the courts and
were therefore denied due process of law.' 5
6See Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dotson v. United States,
287 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1961); Fletcher v. Young, 222 F.2d 222 (4th Cit. 1955).
7351 U.S. 12 (1956).
8 See, e.g., Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40 (1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258
(1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966); Draper v. W'Vashington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms
& Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
9 See 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
10 See note 8 supra.
11 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12 The Harper decision was a bold step by the United States Supreme Court because,
prior to that time, Griffin had been confined strictly to criminal cases. The Harper
decision opened up a new dimension that was anticipated and carefully avoided by the
Griffin Court. See 383 U.S. 663, 670-79 (Black, J, dissenting).
1 See 383 U.S. 663, 665-70 (1966).
14 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
15 Id. at 382.
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The most liberal extension of Griffin into the civil field is illustrated
by a recent Colorado case, In re Smitb."' Smith, a bankrupt, was denied
a request to proceed under the Bankruptcy Act in the status of in forma
pauperis. The United States District Court held that Smith was denied
the "fundamental interest" of "access to court," and that such a denial
was in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution. 7 The court found this to be "analogous" "I
to Boddie, and proceeded on the reasoning that a state could not, con-
sistently with the equal protection clause, make its judicial processes
available to some and deny those processes to others simply because the
latter could not pay a filing fee.
On its face, In re Smith appears to be a logical and proper extension
of Griffin; however, a closer inspection reveals that this case represents
an erroneous, unwarranted, and abusive expansion of Griffin, which
could have the effect of opening a Pandora's box in the area of civil litiga-
tion. 19
In the cases following Griffin, one test used by the courts has involved
weighing the state's interests in obtaining costs and filing fees,20 versus
the "type of right" that would be threatened or denied because of the
fee requirement.2' In all of the cases that have discussed fee require-
ment, the state's interests and reasons for requiring such a charge have
been predictably consistent.22 However, the "type of right" involved
16 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
1 lId. at 1089.
18 Id. at 1090.
19 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), wherein Justice Douglas in a
concurring opinion applauded the further extension of Griffin and stated that he could
".... not see the length of the road we must follow," but he indicated that Griffin could
easily be expanded in any area that the Court deemed of "sufficient importance" (which
may even include free fishing licenses for indigents). Id. at 385.
The detrimental ramifications of this "endless road" approach are obvious. Given free
access to the courts in almost every conceivable civil situation, indigents would flood
the already overcrowded courts with an endless amount of frivolous litigation.
20 In all of these cases the issue involved either a fee charge or a requirement that the
indigent purchase certain items or services that he could not afford.
21 Compare cases cited note 8 supra (criminal cases) 'witb Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
US. 371 (1971) and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (civil cases).
22 The reasons most often cited for maintaining filing fees are: (1) they raise revenue,
(2) they discourage frivolous litigation, and (3) they keep the system more self suf-
ficient than it would be if no fee were charged. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971). See also Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma Pauperis, 60 CoLUM.
L. Rnv. 1203, 1205-08 (1969).
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has varied constantly, and it is this "type of right" which distinguishes
the Griffin case from the Smith case.
In Griffin, and in the criminal cases that followed, the defendant was
in danger of losing his life or liberty because the state had accused him
of a crime and was threatening him with death or incarceration. A right
to appeal and thereby protect these interests was found to be paramount
to any state interest in fees, and could not be denied simply because the
defendant was too poor to afford a transcript. This Griffin reasoning
seems to lose some of its clarity and cogency when it is applied in civil
cases because the "type of right" in civil matters is weaker and less urgent
than the "type of right" found in criminal cases. There is no threat to
life or liberty in civil litigation. There are however, other types of rights
of lesser magnitude that are still considered to be of such "fundamental
interest" that they outweigh the state's interest in requiring a filing fee.
One such right is the right to obtain redress for a wrong. If an injury
is received, the indigent should not be denied access to the courts, and
redress where justified, simply because he is too poor to pay the court
costs.2 Likewise, an individual should not be denied the right to vote
simply because he has no funds to pay the required poll tax. 4 Another
"type of right" in the civil field is the right to a divorce. 25 When one
seeks a divorce he is seeking a change in status. There is no threat to life
or liberty, and often there is no injury involved for which the party is
seeking redress. This "right" to a divorce appears to be the weakest
"type of right" discussed thus far. Nevertheless, the Court in Boddie
held that the right of access to the courts to seek a divorce outweighed
the state's interests in collecting a filing fee. 6 It should be noted how-
ever, that the Court stated that its decision did not determine that access
to the courts is a right guaranteed to all individuals in all types of civil
situations.27 The Court was most careful to explain that indigents could
obtain free access to the courts in divorce cases because the courts were
the only avenues open for dissolving marriages.28
Although the right of access to a court in divorce cases is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the right of access in bankruptcy cases, the court in
23 See note 6 supra.
24 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
25 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d
1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1968).
26 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
27 d. at 382.
28 Id. at 380-82.
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Smith, a bankruptcy case, based its decision on what it called the "anal-
ogous problem" 9 in Boddie, a divorce case. The only analogy that can
be drawn between these two cases is that in each case the plaintiff was
seeking a change in status. Access to court to obtain a status change may
be more correctly catagorized as a "privilege" rather than a "right," and
is consequently more likely to be outweighed by the state's interests in
filing fees than the stronger types of rights discussed previously. The
"privilege" to be declared a bankrupt is even weaker than the "privilege"
to change marital status because the entire basis of the latter type of case
revolves around the fact that the state is the only body that can create
the status of marriage, and the state, through its courts, is the only ave-
nue available when relief is sought to change that status.30 Surely the
parties could not legally decide between themselves to cancel the mar-
riage contract. However, in a situation involving insolvency, the bank-
rupt individual can legally resolve his obligations with his creditors in
any number of waysY1 Unlike the married couple, the bankrupt can
negotiate with the other party to his contract and can cancel it or change
the duties and obligations involved in the contract. The bankrupt has
other means of relief, and access to the courts is not the only avenue open
to him. The state is not responsible for the individual's bankruptcy, nor
does the state require the bankrupt individual to proceed through its
courts to remedy his unfortunate situation. The state merely provides
the individual with the "privilege" of coming into court and being offi-
cially declared a "bankrupt." This "privilege," however, can be limited
with reasonable conditions, such as a justifiable filing fee.
In the case of In re Garland,"' the First Circuit was faced with the
identical issue raised in Smith. The court found the filing fee to be a
reasonable and legitimate state interest which outweighed the indigent's
right of free access to the courts to claim bankruptcy.33 The court, stat-
29 See In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
30 See note 29 supra.
31 An action in contract may be settled in or out of court. The terms of a typical
out-of-court settlement could range from an extension of time in which the debtor
could make payment, to a total extinction of the debt for alternate consideration or
simply gratuitously.
82 428 F.2d 1185 (1970).
33 Id. at 1188. It is a well settled constitutional doctrine that the equal protection
clause does not prohibit a state from discriminating. However, it does require that such
discrimination. be reasonably related to a legitimate government objective. See Martin
v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US. 603 (1960); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Lindsley v.
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ing that a bankruptcy discharge is not a "fundamental right," held that
a denial of free access in such circumstances did not violate the due pro-
cess or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. 4 The
First Circuit indicated that there is actually no denial of access to "court"
in bankruptcy cases because a bankruptcy proceeding is more adminis-
trative than judicial in nature, 5 and although it is administered in a
"court," that "court" and the procedures involved are so distinct 6 from
any other civil proceeding in the judicial system that a valid comparison
cannot be drawn. This distinction is just another example of the differ-
ences in the "types of rights" involved in these cases, and it provides a
further illustration of the relative weakness of the so-called "right" of
free access to the courts to claim voluntary bankruptcy. Clearly, this is
the weakest "right" brought under the Griffin reasoning thus far, and it
is therefore more likely to be outweighed by any legithnate and reason-
able state interest in filing fees. The Garland court found that this "right"
was outweighed by the state's interest.
The Smith decision represents a dangerous and unwarranted expansion
of Griffin. The logical extension of Smith would provide free legal rep-
resentation, investigative personnel, witness fees, court costs, damages,
etc., to all indigents in any civil action they may wish to pursue. Hope-
fully, other jurisdictions will instead adopt reasoning similar to that used
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
34See In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185, 1187 (1970). It may seem unreasonable or
illogical to require a "bankrupt" to pay a filing fee, but when one considers the sub-
stantial benefit received by the bankrupt through the Bankruptcy Act, this small filing
fee (usually less than $50.00) is hardly unreasonable or repressive. Payments may
even be made by installments. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 68(c) (1), 80 (1970). The Smith court
wisely suggested that the obligation to pay the filing fee should not be permanently dis-
charged but should arise again if and when the individual is no longer an indigent and
can pay the fee without undue hardship. See In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1093 (D.
Colo. 1971).
It should also be noted that Congress abolished the in forma pauperis proceedings
formerly allowed in bankruptcy cases; therefore, this specific expression of Congress
takes precedence over the more general provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(1964). See S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946).
3 5 See In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185, 1188 (1970).
361d. at 1187. See also Saint Regis Paper Co. v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 136, 141 (5th Cir.
1966). Even the Smith court recognized this distinction and stated that a bankruptcy
proceeding more resembled interpleader than it did ordinary civil litigation. See In re
Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D. Colo. 1971).
37 See note 33 supra.
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by the Garland court and limit in forma pauperis relief to cases involving
"fundamental interests." 38
D.C.E.
38 Discrimination based on poverty has been considered "invidious discrimination"
in certain cases where a "fundamental interest" was at stake. In Harper, the Supreme
Court held that the right to vote was a "fundamental interest." See also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See generally Michelman, On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAv. L. REv. 7 (1969). The issue raised in
all of these cases is whether the "type of right" sought to be protected is of such sig-
nificant importance to be classified as a "fundamental interest." The Garland and
Smith courts disagreed on the definition of "fundamental interest."
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